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BURCHETT SPEAKS
Malcolm Salmon interviews Wilfred Burchett
Wilfred Burchett, Australia’s most famous journalist, was 
in Paris covering the talks between the United States and 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam when Malcolm Sal­
mon was there for T ribune. In this interview Burchett 
assesses Australian foreign policy, the Paris talks and likely 
developments in Vietnam. H e explains why the Australian 
government continues to refuse him his passport.
SALMON: Could you describe the beginnings and development of 
your stand of opposition to the policy line of Australian Govern­
ments towards Asia?
B U R C H E T T : T he beginning goes back to the strike of the wharfies 
against loading pig-iron to Japan, in  the late thirties, the attitude 
of the government of the day in  giving m oral and economic support 
to Japan in its war of aggression against China. It seemed to me 
that the wharfies displayed not only a higher spirit of morality 
in refusing to nourish the Japanese war machine so clearly engaged 
in a monstrous war of aggression, but also a higher political under­
standing in  recognising the danger for Australia inherent in that 
aggression.
Later, when Prime Minister Menzies took the initiative at a 
British Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in demanding 
that the Burma Road—China’s only lifeline still open to the 
Western world—should be closed, because the fact of its existence 
offended Japan, I was convinced that the then government was on 
a suicidal course as far as Australia itself was concerned. Appease­
ment of Japan I considered not only the height of immorality, 
but the height of political folly. It is worth remembering that this 
appeasement by the then Menzies Government continued virtually 
until the eve of Jap an ’s entry into W orld W ar II.
It was not by accident that one of my first journalistic efforts 
was to visit New Caledonia early in  1941 to write some articles 
warning about Japanese activities there and the inherent dangers 
in  this for Australia. Following this I went up  the Burma Road— 
reopened despite Menzies’ objections, because of American pres­
sure—and was actually in Chungking, then the capital of the China 
of the Kuomintang, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. 
My first book (about New Caledonia) appeared a day or two before 
Pearl H arbor. New Caledonia was almost immediately occupied 
by American troops and the danger to Australia temporarily 
averted.
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Australian policy in Asia, especially South-east Asia, is based on 
supporting the most reactionary Quisling-type government which 
represents in general nothing except United States interests. Aus­
tralian policy is to jum p into every war on the side of such reaction­
ary forces to repress the resistance forces supported by the people. 
T his was true in  Korea and Malaysia. It was not Menzies’ fault 
that Australia did not intervene on the side of the French in the 
latter’s ’d irty  war” in  Indochina. During the 1954 Geneva Confer­
ence, External Affairs M inister Casey offered six battalions of Aus­
tralian troops as part of an international force of intervention 
against the Viet Minh. (The only other “power” to offer troops 
was US-occupied South Korea, and the plan had to be abandoned. 
But the intention was there, the offer made without the Australian 
people even being informed.) Today, in America’s “dirty war” 
against the Vietnamese people, the Australian battalions are there, 
in defence of the Quisling regime, hated by the Vietnamese people, 
despised throughout the world, incapable, like the regime in South 
Korea, of holding power for 24 hours w ithout an American army 
of occupation. T he Australian Government still pretends that the 
Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiw an represent the 700 million 
Chinese people. A radical change of Australian policy towards Asia 
is needed; a correct appreciation of the real, stable, forces of 
progress and stability. For a start Australia should make a clean 
break with US policy in Asia, pull her troops ou t of South 
Vietnam, establish diplomatic relations with China and the Demo­
cratic Republic of Vietnam, and get ready to recognise a real 
government of national union which will eventually be formed 
in South Vietnam. Policies should be based on authentic national 
interests and not on those of the tiny, but influential group of 
Australian capitalists who are prepared to spend any quantity of 
Asian and Australian blood in defending their mines in  Thailand, 
Malaysia and elsewhere.
S: How do you see a successful end to the Vietnamese people’s 
struggle affecting a) the South-east Asian scene, and b) the world
scene?
B: A successful end to the Vietnam people’s struggle would trans­
form the South-east Asian scene. It is already evident that the 
South Vietnam N ational Front for Liberation and its allies are 
going to win and a government of broad national union will be 
established pursuing a policy of neutrality in  international affairs. 
Excellent good-neighborly relations will be established immediately 
with neutral Cambodia—in fact such relations already exist between 
Cambodia and the NFL. An end of the war in South Vietnam 
would immediately create the necessary conditions to stabilise the 
situation in Laos and make workable the three-way neutral coalition 
government envisaged under the 1962 agreements on Laos. These
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agreements were never in  fact implemented because of US interven­
tion in South Vietnam and the waging of “special war” in Laos.
(It must not be forgotten that the US Command was established 
in Saigon in  February 1962 a few months before the Agreements 
on Laos were concluded and CIA planes were already dropping 
US-trained and armed commando groups into the Pathet Lao 
areas before the ink was dry on the 1962 Agreements.) South Viet­
nam, Laos and Cambodia would be stable, neutral states, linked 
by common foreign policies, by their Buddhism and even to a 
certain extent by the influence of French culture.
Relations between them and the DRVN and through the DRVN 
with the rest of the socialist world would be close and friendly. T he 
existence of this bloc of Buddhist, neutralist countries would exer­
cise great influence on T hailand  where resentment against Ameri­
can occupation has already reached boiling point and where neutral­
ist ideas have become extremely popular among intellectuals and 
even in certain circles within the administration.
T he sample of what “liberation” and “defence of freedom” 
American style means as illustrated in South Vietnam will make 
any other South-east Asian country with anything resembling a 
national government, think not twice but two thousand times before 
getting involved in  anything that could open the way to great-power 
intervention again.
Once the war in  South Vietnam is settled, one could imagine a 
bloc of m utually friendly, neutral Buddhist states extending from 
South Vietnam through to Burma, developing m utually advantag­
eous trade and economic relations. T he existence of such a bloc 
would prove a powerful source of attraction to Malaysia also, 
turning that country’s thoughts inward to Asia instead of outward 
to the West. T he anti-US demonstrations in Malaysia, sparked by 
opposition to the war in  Vietnam, show th a t nationalist, pro-Asian 
and progressive sentiments there are on the increase.
As for the world scene, the fact that 31 million Vietnamese have 
stood up to the Western world’s mightiest economic and military 
power will give a fillip to independence movements throughout 
the rest of the T h ird  World. It is possible also that the shattering 
lesson the USA has been given in Vietnam will make any future 
American adm inistration for a generation hesitant to plunge into 
any more such neo-colonialisf wars. T he illusion that the USA 
can play the role of world super-gendarme has been shattered 
in the jungle and rice fields of South Vietnam. T he lessons from 
all this will not be lost on the peoples of L atin  America and Africa 
where there is a great thirst among nationalist and patriotic 
elements to learn from the Vietnamese experience.
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S: Concerning the official conversations in Paris between the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USA, you are on record 
as saying (interview with Peter Smark, The Australian) that “the 
most im portant thing was that the two sides had agreed to sit down 
together.” Could you amplify this?
B: Had W ashington been winning the war—had General West­
moreland driven the NFL forces into a corner and been just about 
to deal the “decisive blow”, there would obviously be no talks 
going on in Paris. If N orth Vietnam was at its last gasp, com­
munications hopelessly disrupted, the economy in ruins, industry 
and agriculture at a standstill, it is obvious also that there would 
be no talks in Paris. T he Pentagon would insist on pushing ahead 
to administer the “coup de grace”. But the fact is that in the 
South, the Americans have been pushed on to the defensive. T heir 
forces have completely lost control of the countryside and are 
pinned down in their bases and cities. T he N orth has more 
than held out. Communications work splendidly with thousands 
of miles of roads and hundreds of bridges more than when the 
war started. Decentralised industry is now producing in  the m oun­
tains and jungles, agricultural production continues to go up 
because of remarkable increases in per-acre yields. Bombing attacks 
of a scale unprecedented in m ilitary history have been absorbed 
by North Vietnam, but people continue to live, to work and to 
fight with undim inished courage and determination. Morale is 
higher than I have ever known it just because the people know 
they have taken on the greatest imperialist power and beaten it.
It is because there are some glimmerings in W ashington that this 
is the real situation, that there are talks in Paris. T his is the 
main reason for my remark that “the most im portant thing is 
that the two sides had agreed to sit down together.” Added to this 
is my experience of the 1954 talks in Geneva and the 1951-52 talks 
in Kaesong-Panmunjon to arrange a Korean ceasefire, that once 
such talks have started, they usually go on to their logical conclusion 
—a settlement.
S: Could you describe the political complexion of the coalition 
government of South Vietnam  likely to emerge from the present 
coriflict (in the broadest terms of course) ?
B: T he NFL officially speak of a “coalition government of broad 
national union”, and this' is just what they have in mind. NFL 
support for the new Alliance of Nationalist, Democratic and Peace 
Forces formed immediately after the T et offensive early this year 
is in  line with this concept. Members of the Alliance’s Central 
Committee thus far named are very well-known Saigon and Hue 
intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, journalists—some of them very well-to- 
do incidentally, but all people of prestige, known for their political
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and moral integrity. One could imagine a coalition formed between 
the NFL, the Alliance and other patriotic elements or individuals, 
who may come forward later, or who have already come forward 
but for security reasons still remain anonymous. Such a coalition 
government, if one studies the NFL and the Alliance programs 
would be comprised of the broadest possible spectrum. W ithin 
the Central Committee of the NFL for instance, one finds revolu­
tionary elements, one finds Buddhists and Catholics, representatives 
of the national minorities, members of the urban bourgeoisie as 
well as the workers and peasants. It represents the greatest expres­
sion of national unity that has ever existed in South Vietnam. US 
policy has been to set the Catholics and Buddhists at each other’s 
throats—as the French did in their time. NFL policy has been to 
bring them toegther. US policy was to set the Vietnamese in the 
plains against the national minorities in the highlands. NFL 
policy has been to unite them. US policy has been to set the 
townspeople against the peasants. NFL policy has been to unite 
them. NFL and DRVN support for the alliance shows also that 
they both foster the maximum of national and political harmony. 
T he fu ture coalition government will obviously reflect just this.
S: Do you see a lengthy period of separation of the two Vietnams 
following an end to the war?
B: This is oviously something that only the Vietnamese people 
can decide. For the foreseeable future, however, I think there 
will be two Vietnams, each with its complete autonomy in internal 
and external affairs. But there will probably be some sort of 
Coordinating Committee comprised of an equal num ber of per­
sons nom inated by each of the two governments, to arrange day- 
to-day questions such as trade, post and telegraph communica­
tions, travel, cultural exchanges, etc.
S: There is speculation that a “second front” in Asia could 
emerge in Korea. W hat is your view?
B: 1 think this is something that has to be watched extremely 
carefully. Certainly, when the USA started its war of interven­
tion in South Vietnam, and even as late as 1965 when the bomb­
ings of N orth Vietnam started, the overall US plans called for 
re-starting the Korean war. There is strong documentary evidence 
of this. At that time the Pentagon was under the illusion that 
US forces would speedily “clean u p ” the guerrillas in South Viet­
nam and would then push on to the North, at the same time 
reopening a “second front” ih Korea. These concepts have been 
shattered by the heroic and eminently successful resistance of 
ihe Vietnamese people in the South as in the North. But there 
are other plans, of which I became aware when I was in Korea 
last year, closely connected with a whole series of US-staged
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provocations in and around the M ilitary Demarcation Line, and 
along the N orth Korean coast — the sort of incidents that led 
to the Pueblo affair. These seemed aimed at the very minimum 
at opening up  a “second front” as a pretext for pu tting  into 
effect secret clauses of the Japan-South Korea treaty and bringing 
Japanese occupation troops into South Korea. Again at a “m ini­
m um ” this would release more South Korean divisions for service 
in South Vietnam. At something more than a “m inim um ” a 
Japanese army would spearhead an invasion of N orth Korea. 
As “bait” for all this, Japanese bankers and industrialists have 
been given unprecedented facilities for investing in South Korea 
on the sort of scale that recalls the days when Korea was a 
Japanese colony. Events in Korea should be watched with utmost 
vigilance.
S: T he public movement against Australia’s participation in 
the Vietnam war is the num ber one new political fact in the 
country. Having observed the anti-Vietnam war movement in 
various countries, have you any comment on what you know of 
the Australian movement?
B: I know only what I read in the newspapers — and complaints 
that news about this movement is almost completely suppressed 
in the newspapers — what I receive in letters from friends, and 
the sort of appreciation given by my Vietnamese friends, similar 
to Mr. Nguyen T han  Le’s reply to your question on this point 
at a recent press conference here in Paris. T he anti-war move­
m ent in Australia is highly esteemed by my Vietnamese friends 
in Hanoi and within the NFL. This is not only a source of 
moral satisfaction because of the support for Vietnam, but be­
cause it confirms the long-standing internationalist position of 
the Vietnamese revolutionary movement that a distinction must 
be made between the people of a country waging war in Vietnam 
and the reactionary governments in power which are responsible.
I would like to stress also that public action, especially in 
countries like Australia which have troops in South Vietnam, can 
play a vital role in making the Paris talks successful, perhaps 
shortening them and thus the war. Now, when the talks have 
started, public pressure is more valuable than ever, especially at 
this moment when the talks on substantive matters are held up 
because of the refusal of the USA to halt the bombings of N orth 
Vietnam.
S: W ould you care to say something about the attitude of the 
Australian Government in  denying your legal right to an Austra­
lian passport?
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B: By refusing me for over 13 years my Australian passport, the 
Australian Government is guilty of an act of political vindictive­
ness almost without precedent. I was born in Australia, my 
father was born in Australia, my grand-father (on my father’s 
side) arrived in Australia at the age of eight. My eldest son was 
born in Australia. At the time of the births of my three other 
children, I have tried to have them registered as Australian 
citizens. This also has been refused. T o  the best of my know­
ledge the Australian Government has tried to bring pressure to 
bear on the British Government to add to my difficulties in 
obtaining a British passport.
T he fundam ental reasons for this have to do with my answer 
to the first of your questions. For the past quarter of a century 
I have opposed Australian policy in South-east Asia and 'if it does 
not change, I hope to continue opposing it for the next quarter 
of a century. In  fact, by refusing me my passport, the Australian 
Government covers itself with ridicule in those many countries 
of the world where I am well enough known to travel on my 
visiting card.
For 13 years my professional activities have been gravely ham ­
pered by the lack of a proper passport. However, when I looked 
at one the other day and saw the list of countries to which I 
could not use an Australian passport to travel, I began to wonder 
whether my professional activities would not be hampered even 
more if I did have such a document which would prevent me 
travelling to N orth Korea, N orth Vietnam and other countries 
to which I need access as art acknowledged Asian specialist. My 
North Vietnamese laissez-passer, is simply inscribed “valid for all 
countries in Europe, Asia and Africa” and I can have an endorse­
ment any time I want it “and all other countries in the world.”
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